Either way, there is no generally agreed-on standard for determining precisely when to declare a match. Others reject point-counting for a more holistic approach. Six points, nine, twelve? Local practices vary, and no established minimum or norm exists. Some fingerprint examiners use a “point-counting” method that entails counting the number of similar ridge characteristics on the prints, but there is no fixed requirement about how many points of similarity are needed. Consider the followingįingerprint examiners lack objective standards for evaluating whether two prints “match.” There is simply no uniform approach to deciding what counts as a sufficient basis for making an identification. Despite nearly 100 years of routine use by police and prosecutors, central assertions of fingerprint examiners have simply not yet been either verified or tested in a number of important ways. Although fingerprinting retains considerable cultural authority, there has been woefully little careful empirical examination of the key claims made by fingerprint examiners. Surprising though it may sound, Pollak’s judgment was correct. Pollak found that fingerprinting flunked the Daubert test, meeting only one of the criteria, that of general acceptance. Daubert invites judges to examine whether the proffered expert evidence has been adequately tested, whether it has a known error rate, whether it has standards and techniques that control its operation, whether it has been subject to meaningful peer review, and whether it is generally accepted by the relevant community of experts. In that opinion, after surveying the evidence, he concluded that, “fingerprint identification techniques have not been tested in a manner that could be properly characterized as scientific.” All in all, he found fingerprinting identification techniques “hard to square” with Daubert, which asks judges to serve as gatekeepers to ensure that the expert evidence used in court is sufficiently valid and reliable. Given Pollack’s about-face, every single judge who has considered the issue has determined that fingerprinting passes the test.Īnd yet, Judge Pollak’s first opinion was the better one.
Since 1999, nearly 40 judges have considered whether fingerprint evidence meets the Daubert test, the Supreme Court’s standard for the admissibility of expert evidence in federal court, or the equivalent state standard. With this second opinion, Pollack became yet another in a long line of judges to preserve the status quo by rejecting challenges to fingerprinting’s admissibility. In an even longer opinion, he bluntly wrote, “I disagree with myself.” After a second evidentiary hearing, he had decided that despite fingerprinting’s latent defects, the opinions of fingerprint identification experts should nonetheless be admissible evidence. What could Judge Pollack have been thinking?Ībout six weeks later, Judge Pollack changed his mind. They have long been considered the gold standard of forensic science and are widely thought to be an especially powerful and indisputable form of evidence. After all, fingerprints have been used as evidence in the U.S. Fingerprints not scientific? The conclusions of fingerprint examiners not admissible in court? It was a shocking thought. Llera Plaza, the distinguished judge and former academic issued a lengthy opinion that concluded, essentially, that fingerprint identification was not a legitimate form of scientific evidence. In January 2002, Judge Louis Pollack made headlines with a surprising ruling on the admissibility of fingerprints. A few judges are showing signs of skepticism, and it’s about time.
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